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  1 1. Introduction 
 
 
Financial and capital flows’ liberalization can play a fundamental role in increasing 
growth and welfare. Typically, emerging or developing economies seek foreign savings to 
solve the inter-temporal savings-investment problem. On the other hand, current account 
surplus countries seek opportunities to invest their savings. To the extent that capital flows 
from surplus to deficit countries are well intermediated and, therefore, put to the most 
productive use, they increase welfare.
2  
 
Liberalization can, however, also be dangerous, as has been witnessed in many past 
and recent financial, currency and banking crises.  It can make countries more vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks. In particular, if serious macroeconomic imbalances exist in a recipient 
country, and if the financial sector is weak, be it in terms of risk management, prudential 
regulation and supervision, large capital flows can easily lead to serious financial, banking or 
currency crises. A number of recent crises, like those in East Asia, Mexico, Russia, Brazil and 
Turkey (described, for example, in IMF (2001)), and, to some extent, the Argentinean episode 




Central Eastern Europe has a somewhat different experience, when compared to other 
emerging regions, concerning the financial liberalization process, as the process there seems 
to have been much less crisis-prone than in, for instance, Asia or Latin America. This maybe, 
at least partially, because the current high degree of external and financial liberalization in the 
Central Eastern European countries (CEECs),
4 beyond questions of economic allocative 
efficiency, must be understood in terms of the process of Accession to the European Union.
5  
 
The EU integration process implies legally binding, sweeping liberalization measures 
–not only capital account liberalization, but investment by EU firms in the domestic financial 
services, and the maintenance of a competitive domestic environment, giving this financial 
liberalization process strong external incentives (and constraints). Those measures were 
                                                 
2The opening up and liberalization of financial services in developing countries would yield, in principle, both 
static and dynamic gains: static, one-shot efficiency gains from optimally allocating the available resources (i.e., 
developed, capital abundant nations would export capital to the developing, capital scarce ones; also 
domestically, deeper, more effective financial systems would facilitate the linkages between domestic savers and 
investors, reducing information asymmetries and scale problems), and dynamic ones because the growth rate 
would be shifted upwards by the increased capital stock created by the greater investment (temporarily, later 
adjusting again to the long run growth trend). 
3A good example of a recent work that supports this cautious line on financial liberalization for emerging 
markets, published by no other organization than the IMF itself, and actually co-authored by its’ them Chief 
Economist, Kenneth Rogoff, see Prasad et al., 2003. 
4For capital mobility indicators for the Eastern European countries, in an index from 0 to 100, where 100 
indicates full liberalization (see IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000), Estonia and Latvia score 97.6, Lithuania 
85.7, the Czech Republic, 73.7, Hungary 59.5, while a “larger” economy like Poland scores 55.3, Slovenia, 40.5, 
Bulgaria 35.3, Slovakia, 23.7 and Romania, the less liberalized in the group, a mere 12.5: the average, non-GDP 
weighted, is 58.14. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the index above was computed in 1997 and that now it is 
certainly higher, especially among the relative laggards like Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia (but with the 
possible exception of Romania), given that, among other things, capital account liberalization is also a (pre)-
requisite for EU membership. 
5In March 31, 1998, the European Commission launched official Accession processes with Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (see Vinhas de Souza at all, 
1999). All those Eastern European countries –bar Bulgaria and Romania, for which the expected date is 2007, plus 
Cyprus and Malta, shall become members of the European Union in early May 2004. 
  2 implemented parallel to the development of a highly sophisticated regulatory and supervisory 
structure, again based on EU standards. This whole process happened also with the EU’s 
technical and financial support, through specific programs –like the PHARE one, for these so-
called Accession, and now Acceding Countries (ACs), and the TACIS, for the former Soviet 
Union ones- and direct assistance from EU institutions, like the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Central Bank (also, on a very early stage of the 
transition process, the influence of the IMF in setting up policies and institutions in several 
countries in the region –an intervention widely considered to haven been successful- was very 
important: see Hallerberg et al., 2002). 
 
Additionally, EU membership in the near future seems to act as an anchor to market 
expectations (see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001), limiting the possibilities of self-
fulfilling financial crises and regional contagion (see Linne, 1999), which had the observed 
devastating effects in both Asia and Latin America (even a major event, like the Russian 
collapse of 1998, had very reduced regional side effects). Several regional episodes of 
financial systems’ instability did happen (see Vinhas de Souza, 2002(a) and Vinhas de Souza, 
2002(b)), but none with the prolonged negative consequences observed in other regions 
(which was also due to the effective national policy actions undertaken after those episodes). 
 
This study’s main aim is to expand the Kaminsky and Schmukler database (see 
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003), from now on indicated as K&S, to include the Accession 
and Acceding Countries from Eastern Europe (namely, for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). In their original 
work, K&S build an extensive database of external and financial liberalization, which 
includes both developed countries and countries from emerging regions (but not from Eastern 
Europe).
6 With that, they create different indexes of liberalization (capital account, banking 
and stock markets: see Table I below) and using them individually and in an aggregate 
fashion, test for the effects and causality of this process on financial and real volatility, for the 
existence of differences between regions, and for the effects of the ordering of the 
liberalization process. With the extended database built in this paper, a similar set of 
regressions –to enable comparability- has been run for the CEECs, and the results are 
contrasted with those for the other regions included in the K&S original study. 
 
One underlying hypotheses of this work is that the existing regulatory and institutional 
framework in Eastern Europe, plus a more sustainable set of macro policies, played an 
important role in enabling liberalization to largely deliver the welfare enhancing outcomes 
that it is supposed to. Such an “anchoring” role of the European Union in the CEECs, through 
the process of EU membership, and through the effective imposition of international standards 
of financial supervision and regulation, may indicate that, beyond multilateral organizations 
like the IMF or the OECD, a greater, pro-active regional stabilizing role in emerging markets 
by regional actors, for instance, the United States, or by some regional sub-grouping, like 
Mercosur, may also be welfare enhancing for other “emerging” regions. 
 
This work is structured as follows: firstly, the individual components of the index will 
be described for my sample of countries. Afterwards, the constructed index and its 
components will be presented, for the sample as whole and for its individual country 
                                                 
6Namely, their index covers the period 01:1973-06:1999, for the following 28 countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Venezuela (emerging markets) and Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States (mature economies). 
  3 members, and compared with K&S’s original index. In the next section, K&S-compatible 
core regressions are run. Afterwards, alternative specifications are estimated. Finally, the 
work ends with a conclusion. 
 
Table I: K&S Liberalization Index 
Capital Account Liberalization  Financial Sector Liberalization  Stock Market Liberalization 
Criteria for Full Liberalization 
-Borrowing abroad by banks and 
corporations 
Banks and corporations are allowed to 
borrow abroad mostly freely. They 
may need to inform the authorities, but 
the authorization is granted almost 
automatically. Reserve requirements 
might be in place but are lower than 
10%. The required minimum maturity 
is not longer than two years. 
And 
-Multiple exchange rates and other 
restrictions 
There are no special exchange rates 
for either current account or capital 
account transactions. There are no 
restrictions to capital outflows. 
Criteria for Partial Liberalization 
-Borrowing abroad by banks and 
Corporations 
Banks and corporations are allowed to 
borrow abroad, subject to certain 
restrictions. Reserve requirements 
might be between 10 and 50%. The 
required minimum maturity might be 
between two and five years. There 
might be caps in borrowing and 
certain restrictions to specific sectors. 
Or 
-Multiple exchange rates and other 
restrictions 
There are special exchange rates for 
current account and capital account 
transactions. There might be some 
restrictions to capital outflows. 
Criteria for No Liberalization 
-Borrowing abroad by banks and 
Corporations 
Banks and corporations are mostly not 
allowed to borrow abroad. Reserve 
requirements might be higher than 
50%. The required minimum maturity 
might be longer than five years. There 
might be caps in borrowing and heavy 
restrictions to certain sectors. 
Or 
-Multiple exchange rates and other 
restrictions 
There are special exchange rates for 
current account and capital account 
transactions. There might be 
restrictions to capital outflows. 
Criteria for Full Liberalization 
-Lending and borrowing interest rates  
There are no controls (ceilings and 
floors) on interest rates. 
And 
-Other indicators  
There are likely no credit controls 
(subsidies to certain sectors or certain 
credit allocations). Deposits in foreign 
currencies are likely permitted. 
Criteria for Partial Liberalization 
-Lending and borrowing interest rates 
There are controls in either lending or 
borrowing rates (ceilings or floors). 
And 
-Other indicators. 
There might be controls in the 
allocation of credit controls (subsidies 
to certain sectors or certain credit 
allocations). Deposits in foreign 
currencies might not be permitted. 
Criteria for No Liberalization 
-Lending and borrowing interest rates 
There are controls in lending rates and 
borrowing rates (ceilings and floors). 
And 
-Other indicators. 
There are likely controls in the 
allocation of credit controls (subsidies 
to certain sectors or certain credit 
allocations). Deposits in foreign 
currencies are likely not permitted. 
Criteria for Full Liberalization 
-Acquisition by foreign investors  
Foreign investors are allowed to hold 
domestic equity without restrictions. 
And 
-Repatriation of capital, dividends, and 
interest 
Capital, dividends, and interest can be 
repatriated freely within two years of 
the initial investment. 
Criteria for Partial Liberalization 
-Acquisition by foreign investors  
Foreign investors are allowed to hold 
up to 49 % of each company's 
outstanding equity. There might be 
restrictions to participate in certain 
sectors. There might be indirect ways 
to invest in the stock market, like 
through country funds. 
Or 
-Repatriation of capital, dividends, and 
interest 
Capital, dividends, and interest can be 
repatriated, but typically not before 
two and not after five years of the 
initial investment. 
Criteria for No Liberalization 
-Acquisition by foreign investors  
Foreign investors are not allowed to 
hold domestic equity. 
Or 
-Repatriation of capital, dividends, and 
interest 
Capital, dividends, and interest can be 
repatriated, but not before five years of 
the initial investment. 
  4 2. Capital Account 
 
 
  The achieving of capital account liberalization happened rather swiftly in most of the 
countries in my sample: by the mid 1990s, all bar Bulgaria and Romania had been declared 
Article VIII compliant (for those two countries, this happened in 1998: see Table II below).  
 
Table II: Capital Account Liberalization 
Countries  EU Association Agreements: Date of 
entry into force 
Article VIII Compatibility  OECD 
Membership 
Bulgaria  -Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed 3/93). 
A “Europe” Trade Agreement also signed 
in 3/93. 
-Application for EU membership: 12/95 





-Czechoslovakia break-up: 1/1/93. 
-(New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (old one 
signed in 12/91, new in 10/93). A 
“Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(signed in 12/91). 
-Application for EU membership: 1/96. 
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the 
Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, and, since 1/93, as 





Estonia  -Independence: 20/8/91 
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU 
signed in 7/94. 
-Application for EU membership: 11/95. 
-IMF entry: 25/5/92. Article 
VIII: 15/8/94. 
 
Hungary  -Europe Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). 
A “Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(also signed in 12/91). 
-Application for EU membership: 3/94. 
-IMF entry: 05/06/1982. 
Article VIII: 1/1/96. 
-5/96: OECD 
Membership. 
Latvia  -Independence: 21/8/91. 
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU 
signed in 7/94. 
-Application for EU membership: 10/95. 
-IMF entry: 19/5/92. Article 
VIII: 10/6/94. 
 
Lithuania  -Independence: declared in 11/3/90, only 
accepted by URSS in 6/9/91. 
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95). 
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU 
signed in 7/94. 
-Application for EU membership: 12/95 
-IMF entry: 29/4/92. Article 
VIII: 3/5/94. 
 
Poland  -Europe Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). 
A “Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(also signed in 12/91). 
-Application for EU membership: 4/94. 
-IMF entry: 06/12/86. 
Article VIII: 1/6/95. 
-11/96: OECD 
Membership. 
Romania  -Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed in 
2/93). A “Europe” Trade Agreement (also 
signed in 2/93). 
-Application for EU membership: 6/95 
-IMF entry: 15/12/72. 
Article VIII: 25/3/1998. 
 
Slovakia  -Czechoslovakia break-up: 1/1/93. 
-(New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed: 
10/93). A Trade Agreement since 3/92 
(signed: 12/91). 
-Application for EU membership: 6/95 
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the 
Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, and, since 1/93, as 




Slovenia  -Independence: 25/6/91. 
-Europe Agreement: 2/99 (signed 6/96). 
-Application for EU membership: 6/96 
-IMF entry: 14/12/92. 
Article VIII: 1/9/95. 
 
 
  5 One of the main driving forces behind this was the process of European Integration, 
for which external liberalization is a pre-requisite: in the early to mid-1990s, all the countries 
had signed Association Agreements with the European Union (frequently preceded by trade 
liberalization agreements with the EU, also called “Europe” trade agreements, usually with 
years given to the countries to prepare for their full implementation) and formally applied for 
EU membership. 
 
Another additional factor supporting liberalization was IMF and OECD membership: 
four of the larger countries in my sample became OECD members during the second half of 
the 1990s. Another factor to be considered, as will become clear with the regressions analysis, 
is the endogenous decision process to liberalize in a sustainable fashion. 
 
 
3. Banking Sector 
 
 
 Financial  integration,  in  the form of the opening up the banking sector to foreign 
banks, is seen as being positive, on a micro level, as foreign banks are usually better 
capitalized and more efficient than their domestic counterparts (of course, the domestic 
banking sector eventually catches-up: for an indication of this process at the ACs, see, among 
others, Tomova et al., 2003). Also from a macroeconomic perspective, financial integration 
maybe positive for the Eastern European countries, both for long run growth and, as there are 
indications that foreign banks do not contract either their credit supply nor their deposit base, 
in helping to smooth the cycle (see de Haas and Lelyveld, 2003: they find some indication 
that this is linked to the better capitalization base and prudential ratios, as better capitalized 
domestic banks behave similarly to foreign banks). Given the bank-centered nature of 
virtually all the financial systems of the future Member States, this is particularly important 
for them. 
 
In most of the future member states, the initial stage of the creation of the two-tier 
banking system,
7 modelled on the Western European “universal bank” system,
8 was 
characterized by rather liberal licensing practices
9 and limited supervision policies (aimed at 
the fast creation of a de novo commercial, private banking sector: see Fleming et al., 1996, 
Balyozov, 1999, Enoch et al., 2002, Sörg et al., 2003). This caused a mushrooming of new 
banks in those countries in the early 1990s.  
 
Parallel to this, a series of banking crises, of varied proportions, affected most of those 
de novo banking systems, due to this lax institutional framework, inherited fragilities from the 
command economy period (the political need to support state-owned, inefficient industries, 
with the consequent accumulation of bad loans and also the financing of budget deficits), 
                                                 
7In the Baltic states, already in 1987, as part of the Gorbachov reforms, the monobank Gosbak (which formed the 
financial system, together with an emissions bank) had spun-off five specialized banks in all URSS republics 
(Savings, Agriculture, Social, Industry and Construction, and Foreign Trade: a somewhat similar specialization 
was to be found in most other centrally planned economies, with, at least, a “central bank”, a savings bank and a 
foreign trade one). 
8Levine (2002), after performing a panel analysis of large number of countries, concludes that either bank or 
market-based (i.e., via stock markets) financial systems can be growth-enhancing: what actually is relevant is the 
overall development of financial sector and, specially, the  quality and effectiveness of the institutional 
framework (contract enforcement, investor protection, etc.). 
9Sometimes almost comically so: as an example, in the early 1990s, Latvia allowed the creation of a bank –
appropriately called Olympia Bank– just to finance the Latvian Olympic team. 
  6 macroeconomic instability, risky expansion and investment strategies and also sheer 
inexperience, both from the investors and from regulators. Progressively, the re-capitalization, 
privatization and internationalization of the banking system (mostly into the hands of EU 
financial conglomerates), coupled with the implementation of a more robust, EU-modeled 
institutional framework, did away with most of those problems.  
 
Two of the worst cases where the set of Baltic banking crises and the Bulgarian 
episode, which are described in more detail on Box I below. Other smaller banking crises 
happened in Estonia in 1994 and 1998, and in Latvia in 1994. Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003, 
report smaller episodes of “financial sector distress” in the Czech Republic (94-95), Hungary 
(93), Poland  (91-93),
10 Romania (98-00), Slovakia (97) and Slovenia (92-94). 
 
The initial proliferation of banks was, quite naturally, followed by a process of 
consolidation and strengthening –parallel to the privatization of the remnant state-owned 
components of the financial system– of the banking sector in most of those economies (in 
Bulgaria, from 81 banks in 1992 to 35 in 2001, in the Czech Republic from 55 in 1995 to 38 
in 2001, Estonia, from 42 in 1992 to 7 currently, while Hungary had 33 banks in 2002, 
showing only a very slight decrease from the early 1990s,
11 Latvia from 56 in 1994 to 23, 
Lithuania from 27 in 1993 to 13,
12 in Poland from 81 in 1995 to 71 in 2001,
13 in Romania 
from 45 in 1998 to 41 in 2001,
14 in Slovakia  from 22 in 2000 to 19 in 2001, and in Slovenia, 
where the number fell from 25 to 21 during 2001 alone
15).  
 
This consolidation process was frequently led by foreign companies, which now hold 
the majority of the assets of the banking system in virtually all of them –contrary to the 
situation in the current EU Member States– bar Slovenia.
16 This process now has a component 
of regional expansion of the Eastern European banks themselves, or, more precisely in most 
cases, the regional expansion of Western banks via some of their locally-owned subsidiaries 
(see Sörg et al., 2003, ibid). The share of banking assets to GDP, nevertheless, is still far 
below the Euroarea average (which stood at around 265% of GDP by end 2001), compared 
with 47% in Bulgaria, 136% in the Czech Republic, 72% in Estonia and Latvia, 32% in 
Lithuania, 63% in Poland, 60% in Hungary, 30% in Romania, 96% in Slovakia and 94% in 
Slovenia (data also for 2001).
17 
 
                                                 
10Reininger et al., 2002, estimate the costs of the re-capitalization programs to have reached 12% of the GDP for 
the Czech Republic, 7% for Hungary and 1.4% for Poland, for the late 1990s. Caviglia et al., 2002, quotes much 
higher numbers (25%, 13% and 8%), but those figures are for the whole 1990s. 
11Plus 8 credit institutions, and 191 savings and credit cooperatives. 
12Plus 41 credit unions. 
13Plus 642 cooperative banks. 
14Plus 925 credit cooperatives and an astonishing 4,439 credit unions. 
15Plus 45 savings and loans institutions. 
16In Bulgaria, around 80% of the assets of the banking system are foreign owned, 95% in the Czech Republic, 
63% in Hungary, 70% in Poland, 55% in Romania, 83% in Slovakia. In the Baltic republics, around 98% of 
assets in Estonia, 68% in Latvia, and 87% in Lithuania are foreign owned (see Sörg et al., 2003, ibid). Especially 
for Estonia, were 82% of the assets are Swedish-held, this may imply a higher likelihood of exposure of its 
financial system to parent bank country-specific shocks (which also depends on the degree of diversification of 
assets of the parent bank: see IMF, 2003(b)). Slovenia is the “laggard”, with 25.3% of the banking system still 
state-owned (Romania has the highest share of state-ownership, with 42%), and only 28% foreign owned –
which, nevertheless, was an almost doubling of the share, just between 2001 and 2002. 
17Part of this financial shallowness is due to the fact that a substantial part of the investment financing for 
companies is done via inter-company financing, due to the large share of foreign ownership, and due to direct 
commercial financing with non-resident banks. The latter also happens, to smaller degree, with commercial 
credit to households (see Reininger at al, 2002, ibid., and Caviglia at al., 2002, ibid.) 
  7 Another peculiar feature of the banking system in the region is that foreign currency 
lending –usually euro-denominated
18– to residents is very high, especially in the Baltic 
republics: with 80% of total loans in Estonia, 56% in Latvia and 61% in Lithuania. Also, the 
Baltic countries have substantial shares of deposits by non-residents, with over 10% in 
Estonia and Lithuania and close to 5% in Latvia (Latvia, with its close trading ties to Russia, 
has a particular strategy of selling itself as a stable financial services center to CIS depositors: 
see IMF, 2003(b), ibid). 
 
The supervision system has also substantially improved, and, following recent 
international –and EU- best practice, is now centered in independent universal supervisory 
agencies in the most advanced of those countries
19 (Reininger et al., 2002, ibid., estimate that 
the formal regulatory environment for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is actually 
above the EU, and that its actual enforcement level is at its average; Liive, 2003, gives a 
description of the Estonian experience that culminated in the creation of the EFSA –Estonian 
Financial Supervisory Authority- in January 2002). 
 
Box I: Banking Crises in Eastern Europe 
 
   The Baltic bank crises were, to different degrees, linked to liquidity difficulties related to
relations with Russia (in the November 1992 Estonian case, by the freezing of assets held by some
Estonian banks in their former Moscow headquarters, while the Latvian and Lithuanian episodes of,
respectively, March and December 1995, were caused by the drying-up of lucrative trade-financing
opportunities with Russia, whose export commodities, at that time, were still below world price
levels) and regulatory tightening (Latvia, Lithuania), compounded by the elimination of credit
opportunities with the implementation of the Estonian and Lithuanian CBAs (Currency Board
Arrangements). In Lithuania, as in Bulgaria, the financing of the budget deficit also played a role. In
the Estonian and Latvian cases, around 40% of the assets of the banking system where
compromised, in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian cases, around a third. 
 The Bulgarian 1996-1997 crisis eliminated a third of its banking sector, and led the country
to hyperinflation (reaching over 2000% in March 1997, see Yotzov, 2002). Its roots lie in the
political instability that preceded it (which, on its turn, led to inadequate real sector reform, with
state-owned, loss making enterprises being financed via the budget deficit or through arrears with
the, at the time, still mostly state-owned part banking sector: those arrears were, in turn, partially
monetized by the Bulgarian National Bank –BNB- and the largest state bank, the State Savings
Bank -SSB). Periodic foreign exchange crises (March 1994, February 1997) and bank runs (late
1995, late 1996, early 1997) were part of this picture. The implementation of tighter supervisory
procedures during 1996 (giving the BNB the power to close insolvent banks), and a tightening of
policy actually led to more bank runs. A caretaker government in February 1997 (before a newly
elected government took power in May) paved the way to longer lasting reform and the
implementation of the CBA, with its tighter budget constraints towards both the government and the
banking sector. This reform process happened with the support from multilateral institutions
amely, the IMF).  (n
                                                 
18The potential exposure to currency risk caused by this is somewhat limited by the fact that several of the ACs –
namely, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania– have euro-based currency boards and all of the ACs are, of course, 
prospective members of the euro area. 
19Garcia Herrero and Del Rio, 2003, find no significant difference in terms of financial sector stability between 
central bank-centered and independent financial supervisory authorities. Schinasi, 2003, describes the rationale 
for central bank-centered financial supervisory authorities. 
  8 4. Stock Markets 
 
 
The existence of stock markets is assumed to be beneficial for economic performance. 
In principle, it provides a way for companies to raise capital at lower costs than through 
simple banking intermediation, and because it is not as restricted a source of capital as 
internal financing. Also, it is assumed that the existence of alternative modes of finance may 
reduce the likelihood of credit crunches caused by problems with the banking sector (see 
Greenspan, 2000). Additionally, the existence of external ownership is (or was, given the 
recent problems with market-based governance in the US and the EU, and the shift towards a 
more regulated environment) assumed to provide better governance for the management of 
firms. The majority of economic analyses seem to support the position that a diversified 
financing mix is positive for economic growth and stability. 
 
  As described in the previous section, all the financial sectors in the future Member 
States are bank-centered, with stock markets playing marginal roles in most of them (and, in 
some, a very marginal role: in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania, their average market 
capitalization in GDP terms is below 5%: see Figure I below).  
 
Table III: Date of (Re-)Creation of Stock Exchanges. 
Country  Date of Creation of Stock Exchange 
Bulgaria  -5/92: First Stock Exchange begins trading (up to 20 regional ones created); 10/97: The 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange-Sofia (resulting from the consolidation of the previous ones) 
opened. Stock index available from 1/98 
Czech Rep.  4/93: Current Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available from 5/94 
Estonia  -5/96: Foundation of Tallinn Stock Exchange; 2/02: Merge with Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(HEX). Stock index available from 6/96 
Hungary  -6/90: Stock Exchange (re-) established. Stock index available from 2/91 
Latvia  -12/93: Stock Exchange established. 8/02: Finnish HEX acquires Riga Stock Exchange and 
Depositary. Stock index available from 2/96 
Lithuania  -9/93: Stock Exchange trading begins. Stock index available from 1/96 
Poland  -4/91: Warsaw Stock Exchange re-opened. Stock index available from 5/91 
Romania  -11/95: Stock Exchange begins to operate. Stock index available from 5/98 
Slovakia  -4/93: Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available from 9/93 
Slovenia  -12/89: Stock Exchange established. Stock index available from 1/94 
 
 
All of these countries had (re-)established stock markets
20 by the mid-90s
21 (see Table 
III above). About half of the future Member States used them to drive the initial process of re-
privatisation, either via mass issues of voucher certificates for residents (the most famous case 
of this strategy was the Czech Republic), or via IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) re-privatisation 
processes,
22 to lock-in domestic and foreign strategic investors (see Claessens at al., 2000). In 
the voucher-driven privatization, the initial large number of investors and traded stocks in 
those stock markets was soon concentrated in a rather limited number of institutional 
investors –domestic and foreign- and “blue chip” stocks.
23 In the IPO-driven markets, the 
                                                 
20One must not forget that those were mostly integrated market economies before the disruptions caused by the 
Second World War and the posterior Russian occupation: The Warsaw Stock Exchange was created as early as 
1817, and the first Prague stock market was created in 1871 (see Bhattacharya and Baouk, 2002).  
21The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Slovenia was a part, combined from early on elements of 
a market economy with its command system: its stock market, was, therefore, (re)created sooner, in 1989. 
22Namely, in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
23Due to this, Ihnat and Prochazka, 2002, put the real Czech equity market capitalization at about half of its 
apparent GDP share. 
  9 number of stocks and investors actually tended to increase with time, albeit from a rather 
concentrated base. 
 
Even in the largest ones, nevertheless, market capitalisation, as a GDP share, was and 
remains rather low (see Figure I below), and far below the EU average (around 72% of GDP). 
Only in the Czech Republic, Estonia
24, Hungary and Slovenia the average market 
capitalization is above a 20% GDP share, while in Romania is below 1% in several years.
25 
Also, the average market turnover is equally below the one observed in comparable EU 
economies. Similarly to what is observed in the banking sector, the initial regulatory 
environment was deliberately lax, and the regulators were plagued by much the same 
problems of inexperience and limited number of staff and resources.
26 
 


























  Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the author. 
 
This does not mean that domestic agents in those countries lack access to the financial 
services supposed to be provided by stock markets: the very process of opening up, the 
increase in cross-border trade in financial services, the harmonization of rules for capital 
trading with the EU (including the ongoing efforts of the Lamfalussy Committee towards a 
single European market for securities: according to the current proposal, small and medium 
size firms would be able to use a simplified prospectus valid throughout the EU and choose 
the country of its approval), plus the development of information technology, all imply that is 
not actually necessary –nor economically optimal, given economies of scale– for each 
                                                 
24Estonia, with the highest share, close to 40% of GDP, above even Hungary, an “early reformer”, is an 
interesting case, especially when one considers that this was done basically by attracting strategic foreign 
investors via IPOs (as indicated above) and without any significant market for government debt –contrary to 
Latvia and Lithuania– as Estonia is constitutionally required to hold a balanced budget (see IMF, 2003(b), ibid.). 
On the other hand, on the Central European economies with larger stocks of public debt and average public 
deficits (see Vinhas de Souza and Borbély, 2003), the existence of a public debt market may have helped those 
stock markets (see Reininger at el., 2002, ibid). 
25Pogonaru and Apostol, 2002, blame this dismal performance on a failed “voucher” mass privatization process 
and on a general policy inconsistency towards reforms. 
26In some cases, the regulatory structure was not even created, as was the initial situation in the Czech Republic. 
  10 individual country to have its own separate stock market.
27 One must also recall that the 
current national stock markets in the mature developed economies are themselves the result of 
process of consolidation –and closing- of smaller regional stock markets (as was observed in 
Bulgaria in the early 1990s), which still today coexist with larger, dominant national stock 
exchanges even in some mature markets, like Germany and the US. 
 
  Nevertheless, the observed tendency of domestic larger companies, with presumed 
better growth prospects, to list abroad (see Table IV below), due to the obvious cost
28 and 
liquidity advantages of the larger international stock markets, does seems, on balance,
29 to 
deprive those stock markets of liquidity (see Claessens at al., 2003). On the other hand, non-
residents seem to play a major role in most of those markets (accounting for 77% of the 
capitalization in Estonia, 70% in Hungary and half of the free-float capitalization in 
Lithuania). 
 
Table IV: Listed Firms and Cross Listings 
  
Market capitalization of 
Internationally Listed firms/Total 


















Bulgaria  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  30* 
Czech Republic  98.90 11.8  40  36  111
Ρ 
Estonia  95.30 84.7  8  44.4  18 
Hungary  99.80 14.6  52  74.3  70 
Latvia  0.30 0.6  2  12.5  16 
Lithuania  42.40 337.3  5  11.4  44
§ 
Poland  81.30 62.5  30  12.2  246
Ν 
Romania  N.A  N.A  N.A  N.A  63 
Slovakia  76.20 N.A  6  23.1  26 
Slovenia  7.00 5.9  2  1  189 
Average  62.60  73.9  14.5 26.9 81.3 
Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the author; *In the  “Official Market”, in the “Free Market” for small 
caps, another 372 (in 2001); 
ΡIt is estimated that only 15 shares are actively traded; 
§In the “Official Market” 
only six companies are listed; 
ΝDue to legal reasons, major foreign-owned banks are forced to list on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange: they are believed to be responsible for a full third of the market capitalization, while 90% of the 
“free float” is done by just 20 stocks. 
 
                                                 
27As a matter of fact, two of the stock markets in my sample, Estonia and Latvia, had their Stock Exchanges 
acquired by the Helsinki Stock Exchange –HEX- in 2002. There are also several overlapping regional 
associations and linkages with other EU stock markets, like the i) co-operation between all Baltic stock 
exchanges formalized by a memorandum of understanding signed in April 1999, which quotes a joint list of 
Baltic companies, ii) the establishment of a joint index of Central European Stock Exchanges, known as CESI 
Index, which has been calculated by Budapest Stock Exchange since July 1996 and comprises the most liquid 
securities from the Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw exchanges, or iii) the NEWEX, established in 
November 2000 as a joint venture of the Frankfurt and Vienna Stock Exchanges to list Central Eastern European 
stocks. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange and the Athens Stock Exchange also signed a memorandum of 
understanding in 2001.  
This actually mirrors developments among stock markets in the more mature EU markets, like the merger of the 
Belgian, Dutch, French and Portuguese national stock exchanges that resulted in the creation of the 
EURONEXT, or the more loose association of four of the five Scandinavian stock exchanges –bar the Finnish 
HEX, which opted to expand by directly acquiring the smaller Baltic exchanges– that resulted in the NOREX. 
28Domowitz et al., 2000, estimates that the total trading costs in the Stock Markets of Budapest and Prague were 
three times higher than the ones observed in Germany and the US. 
29On the other hand, a foreign listing may also increase domestic trading, if this foreign listing is perceived by 
domestic investors a sign of quality of a particular stock. Also, foreign stock trading may, in principle, also be 
unwound at the domestic stock market itself. 
  11  
  All the specific questions described above concerning the way those stock exchanges 
were founded and their later developments, plus their relative smallness and shallowness, 
affect the dynamics of their stock market indexes (SMI),
30 and are clearly reflected by them 
(as one may see in Figure II, below). This, coupled with the rather limited duration of the 
series, may affect their adequacy as proxies of financial cycles, as one will see on Section 7. 
 











































































Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania
Slovakia Slovenia
Source: Datastream, modified by the author. The price indexes here were converted to US Dollars and re-based 




6. Estimated Indexes 
 
 
  The construction of the index for this new sample of countries was the core of this 
work. A comprehensive effort was done to crosscheck the information collected from papers 
and publications with national sources.
31  Below I present the estimated monthly index, for 
the period January 1990 to June 2003  (see Figure III). The base data for its construction was 
collected from IMF and EBRD publications, then exhaustively verified both with national 
sources and with works written about the individual countries and the region. This is an index 
that falls with liberalization, where maximum liberalization equals one and minimum three (in 
                                                 
30Reininger et al., 2002, ibid., estimate that for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, five  stocks are 
responsible for 50% of the weight of the respective stock market indexes. 
31The author would like to thank the Austrian National Bank (Jarko Fidrmuc), Bank of Bulgaria (Nikolay 
Nenovsky), Czech National Bank (Vit Barta and Michal Slavik), Bank of Estonia (Raoul Lättemäe), National 
Bank of Hungary (Ágnes Csermely  and Zoltán Szalai), Bank of Latvia (Zoja Medvedevskiha and Martins 
Prusis), Bank of Lithuania (Violeta Klyviene), Bank of Poland (Mariusz Jarmuzek), Bank of Romania (Dorina 
Antohi), National Bank of Slovakia (Juraj Janosik), Bank of Slovenia (Janko Tratnik and Karmen Juren), 
Bratislava Stock Exchange (Andrea Hippova and Monika Zabadalova), Budapest Stock Exchange, Ljubljana 
Stock Exchange (Barbara Meza), Prague Stock Exchange (Eva Hoskovcová), Riga Stock Exchange (Inese 
Purgaile), Sofia Stock Exchange (Pantaley Karasimeonov), Tallinn Stock Exchange (Sandra Meigas), National 
Stock Exchange of Lithuania (Arminta Saladziene), Warsaw Stock Exchange (Monika Matlak) for their help in 
the construction of the liberalization index used here. 
  12 this sense, one could actually see it as an index of financial repression). As an additional 
robustness check, the year-end value of the index here constructed was regressed on the 
combined EBRD’s yearly indexes of banking sector reform and non-banking financial sector 
reform. The results from a panel regression with the index constructed here on the LHS and 
the EBRD index on the RHS yield a coefficient of .60, and correlations among the individual 
country-specific index series range from -0.91 to –0.35. 
 























As one may see from Figure III above, the process of integration and liberalization 
was almost continuous throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The spikes in the “Full 
Liberalization Index” in the early 1990s do not indicate reversals: the merely reflect the entry 
into the sample of the newly independent Baltic republics. As former members of the Soviet 
Union, they “enter” the world as highly closed economies, but those countries introduced 
liberalization reforms almost immediately from the start. After this, a slight increasing trend, 
that does reflect a mild liberalization reversal, is observed, starting mid-1994 and lasting until 
early 1997, from when a continuous liberalization trend is observed: this reversal will be 
explained below. Noteworthy here is the fact that virtually none of the obvious candidates for 
a reversal of liberalization (the 1997 Asian Crisis, the collapse of the Czech monetary 
arrangement in 1997, the collapse of the Bulgarian monetary arrangement in 1996/97, the 
1998 Russian Crisis, the 1999-2001 oil price shocks –as all those economies are highly 
dependent of imported energy sources) seems to have driven these mild liberalization 
reversals. 
 
Comparing the Full Index constructed here with the one constructed by K&S, for 
similar time samples, one may observe that the ACs start substantially below the average level 
of other emerging markets –i.e., they are more liberalized, but both the “entry” of the initially 
less liberalized former Soviet republics, plus continuous liberalization efforts in the emerging 
market K&S set reverse this situation. A similar liberalization reversal trend in both the ACs 
and the merging market set is observed from early 1994, but it is actually slightly stronger on 
the ACs sample, until its reversal in 1996. By the end of my sample, the ACs are clearly 
below the final value for the emerging set in K&S’s sample. This sort of remarkably fast 
pattern of the ACs’ “leap-froging” towards best international practice is also observed in 
several types of institutional frameworks, like, for instance, monetary policy institutions and 
  13 instruments (see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001): a process that virtually took decades 
for Western central banks was compressed in a half a dozen years in the Future Member 
States. Nevertheless, by the end of the sample, both emerging and ACs are still above the 
level of mature, developed economies. 
 
















































































Analyzing the individual components of the index (see Figure V next page), one may 
see that, abstracting again from the initial spikes in the index, which are, as explained above, 
caused by the addition of new countries to the sample, the 1994/1997 reversal of liberalization 
was essentially driven by the Financial Sector liberalization component. As will become clear 
with the country specific analysis below, this was related, in most cases, to –and here it must 
be stressed that those were rather limited reversals- to the banking crises that plagued several 
countries in my sample in the early to mid 1990s. 
 
























Comparing now the individual components of the Full Index constructed here with the 
ones from K&S, again for emerging and mature economies, it becomes clear that the reversals 
observed in Figure IV were driven by different sources in the emerging set (increase in capital 
  14 account restrictions) and ACs set (financial sector): see Figure VI below. All the indexes for 
mature economies are, again as one would expect, substantially lower. 
 












































































ACs-Domestic Financial Sector ACs-Capital Account Liberalization
ACs-Stock Market Emerging-Domestic Financial Sector
Emerging-Capital Account Liberalization Emerging-Stock Market




One could, in principle, aggregate the countries in my sample in three different 
groups: rapid liberalizers (the ones that followed a “big bang” early approach, without major 
reversals: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), consistent liberalizers (the ones that followed 
a more delayed path, but also without major roll backs: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) 
and cautious liberalizers (the ones whose liberalization path was either openly inconsistent or 
downright mistrustful: Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). A brief country-by analysis is on Box II 
below, and the individual country graphs are on Annex I. 
 
 
Table V: Values of the Full Index by Country 
 Bulgaria Czech Rep.  Estonia  Hungary Latvia Lithuania  Poland Romania  Slovakia Slovenia 
Average Index  1.17  1.21  1.53  1.81  1.21 1.35  1.68 2.05 1.93 1.92 
Initial Value of Index  2.37  1.30  3.00 2.47  3.00 3.00  2.30 2.83 2.40 2.13 
Final Value of Index  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.20  1.53 1.60 1.30 1.07 
  15 Box II: Country-by-Country Liberalization Path. 
 
 
-In Bulgaria, virtually no sign of a liberalization reversal is observed, even during the substantial
stress experienced by the country during the banks runs of 1996/97 and the ultimate collapse of the
floating regime in 1997 (beyond ad hoc restrictive measures adopted by the banks themselves, as
described on Annex II). As in most of the countries in my sample, the stock market is the last one to
liberalize, but does so in a faster fashion. Nevertheless, this is in most cases a data quasi-artifact that
arises from the later (re-)constitution of the stock exchange itself. 
-In the Czech Republic, a limited reversal of the financial sector liberalization is observed from late
1995 to late 1997, namely, via the imposition of limits on banks’ short-term open positions towards
non-residents, as a way to limit the exposure of the financial sector to the inflows brought about by
the hard peg and the potential gains with interest rate differentials. After the peg was replaced by the
current float regime, this restriction is duly removed. 
-In Estonia, again, virtually no sign of a liberalization reversal is observed, even during the bank
runs of the early 1990s, the unwinding of the 1997 bubble, nor during the 1998 Russian crisis.
Again, the stock market is the last one to liberalize, but one more time, this arises from the later
constitution of the stock exchange. 
-In Hungary, also no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed. Hungary was an early
reformer, introducing some liberalization measures already during the late 1980s, but the profile of
its reform path is much more discounted through time, as compared, for instance, with the Baltic
countries. 
-In Latvia, a rather limited reversal of the financial sector liberalization is observed from mid 1996
all the way to early 2003: resulting from the 1996 banking crisis, specific aggregate lending limits to
regions (i.e., limits on exposure to non-OECD countries, bar the other Baltic republics) are imposed. 
-In Lithuania, a limited reversal of the financial sector liberalization is observed from early 1998,
also resulting from the experienced banking crisis: reserve requirements on deposits on foreign
accounts by non-resident are introduced; 
-In Poland, no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed. Similarly to Hungary, the profile of
its reform path is much more discounted through time; 
-In Romania, no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed, but the reform path is a decidedly
slow and cautious one: at the end of the sample, it has the highest (i.e., less liberalized) score for the
“Full Index” of all countries in the sample: 1.60 (see Table V). 
-In Slovakia, no signs of any liberalization reversal are observed. Here, the reform path is
characterized by a broad stagnation since the Czechoslovak partition till 1998/1999, when, after a
change in the political leadership, reforms are re-started, reaching after that levels similar to the
other “Visegrad” countries in a rather quick fashion. 
-In Slovenia, one of the most consistently cautious future Member States concerning the advantages
of integration and liberalization, reversals are indeed observed in all three indexes, since early 1995
in the capital account and financial sector components, and from early 1997 in the stock market one.
Since early 1999, with the entry in effect of the EU Association Agreement, across-the-board further
(re)liberalization measures have been introduced. 
  16 6. Financial Cycles and Liberalization 
 
 
  The financial cycle coding which is used by K&S defines cycles as a at least twelve 
month-long strictly downwards (upwards) movement, followed by a equally upwards 
(downwards) 12-month movement from the through (peak) of a stock market index, measured 
in USD, as they should reflect returns from the point of view of an international investor. As 
described in the stock market section of this work, one must be warned that there are specific 
factors in the countries in my sample that may affect the effectiveness of a stock market index 
as an adequate proxy of financial cycles, at least for the sample here considered. Beyond that, 
these series have a rather limited time extension (my sample covers the 01:1990-06:2003 
period).
32 Adapting K&S criteria to the limited time dimension of my sample, I use a less 
stringent definition of “cycle”, the same algorithm as above but with a 3-month window for 
the cycle (Edwards et al., 2003, use a 6-month window). With this I get 118 observations for 
all countries in my sample. Of these 118 cycles, 61 are upward, with an average of 7.51 
months duration, and 57 are downward, with an average of 8.20 months of duration (see 
Figures VII to XVI, next pages)
33. 
 

























































                                                 
32Questions concerning the adequacy of this measure are not restricted to emerging markets: for instance, after 
the end of the longest recorded continuous expansion and the “bursting of the bubble” in the US in 2000, the 
Dow Jones index lost over 3000 points between January 2000 and December 2002 (conveniently after the end of 
K&S’s sample), or over a full quarter of its value, without any changes in financial liberalization in the US. 
Other major stock indexes suffered even greater –and almost continuous– losses: in a similar time period, the 
UK’s FTSE-100 fell from over 6750 to below 3500, while the German DAX fell from over 7500 to below 2500, 
also without changes in liberalization. 
33Full dating and country distribution of cycles are available from the author upon request. 




































































These cycles would be spurious if the stock market indexes here followed a random 
walk. To try to prove that a random walk does not captures the features of these series, I 
estimate random walks with drifts, using parameters derived from the data. Then, for each 
country, a specific model is simulated 100 times. The data is then filtered with the same 
algorithm above and the cycles compared. The table below shows the results, indicating that 
the differences of the means of the actual and simulated series are statistically significant. 
 
Table VII: Test of Equality of Means between Actual and Simulated Data 
   Random Walk (mean)  Actual Data (mean)  
Phase  Duration in months  Difference of means (F-value) 
Booms 6.48  7.51  0.01 
Crashes 6.44  8.20  0.00 
 
  After this test procedure, following K&S, I estimate their core regression, given by 
 




i i i d d d X amplitude + + + + =
1 1 1 1 (1) 
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where the variable amplitude is two series with the amplitudes of the downwards or upwards 
movement of a stock market index, calculated as the depth of the contraction (height of the 
expansion). Following K&S, this is estimated as the change between peak (trough) and the 
following trough (peak) of the cycle identified as above, and them as a percentage of the 
average value observed during this cycle for country i. Xi is a matrix of control variables 
(which includes the world real interest rate –here defined as the US Prime Lending Rate 
minus the CPI inflation in time t, world output growth, here represented by a linear 
combination of the monthly log industrial production series for the US, Germany and Japan, 
and domestic output growth, here proxied by the monthly log industrial production series for 
each country) with their average value during the cycle, while d is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the cycle occurs during “non-liberalized” periods, while  is the  “short-run” 
dummy that equals one if the cycle occurs shortly after liberalization, and while  is a 











Again, one must be warned about some features concerning the industrial production 
indexes for this sample of countries: beyond their short time span, they are affected by the so-
called “transition” recession: the stylised pattern of post-reform growth of a transition economy 
is characterized by a sharp initial fall followed by recovery and growth.
35 The opening-up and 
the onset of market prices made some sectors uncompetitive virtually overnight. This, coupled 
with the traditional “over-industrialization” of the former centrally-planned economies, plus 
the early collapse of their Eastward-biased trade linkages had substantial effects on the level 
and composition of their industrial output (in Lithuania, the most extreme case in my sample, 
for instance, the industrial production index lost almost 70% of its original value). This 
instability can be clearly seen in Figure XVII below. 
 


























































































  Source: Datastream and National Statistical Offices, modified by the author. 
                                                 
34K&S use the –admittedly arbitrary– windows of 48 months and 60 months (4 and 5 years) to characterize their 
short and long runs. They state that their results are robust to the change in dimension of those “windows”. As 
the aim of this work is to extend theirs, I use the same short and long run windows. 
35For a stylized description of this general post-transition “U-shaped” growth trajectory (with some exceptions, 
like Belarus), see Havrylyshyn et al., 1998, Fischer and Sahay, 2000 and Bakanova et al., 2004. Most of the ACs 
had reached their “pre-transition” GDP levels –and some surpassed them- by the early 2000s. 
  19 6.1. Estimations 
 
 
With the provisos above, I perform a heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS estimation. 
The results are show in Table VIII below
36. As one may see, the R
2 is high, there minor signs 
of heteroskedasticity, world output is significant in both types of cycles with a positive sign, 
while the other variables in the control set are non-significant, and all have rather small point 
estimates
37. Concentrating on the coefficients of main interest to this analysis, the financial 
repression variable (here represented by a dummy that equals one in periods without partial or 
full liberalization, defined as above, and zero otherwise) is strongly significant in both types 
of cycles, as are the short and long run dummies. Financial liberalization increases the 
amplitude of upward cycles by around 3% in the short run (the K&S estimate for emerging 
markets is 37%, and 51% in mature ones) and by 6.6% in the long run, when compared to the 
period of financial repression (the K&S estimate for emerging markets is a long run decrease 
of 25%, and of 10% in mature ones)
38. On the other hand, crashes decrease with liberalization 
by 1.3% in the short run (in K&S, crashes in emerging markets increase their amplitude by 
28% in the short run, and decrease by 20% in mature markets), but they increase in the long 
run by 0.9% (in K&S, crashes decrease by 12% in emerging markets and by 43% in mature 
markets in the long run).  
 
Table VIII 
Included observations:  61(up) 57 (down)  Upward Cycle  Downward Cycle 
Variables  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
World Real Interest Rate  0.01 0.01 -0.02  0.02 
World Output  -0.02* 0.00  -0.02**  0.01 
Domestic Output  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Financial Repression Dummy  1.97* 0.56 2.35* 0.86 
Short Run Liberalization Dummy  2.02* 0.56 2.32* 0.83 
Long Run Liberalization Dummy  2.09* 0.57 2.37* 0.83 
Constant now show. * and ** indicate significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively.  R
2: 0.80  DW: 2.07  R
2: 0.89  DW: 2.51 
 
As a general conclusion, one can say that the K&S inference that financial 
liberalization has short run costs for emerging markets is not observed in my ACs sample. 
The results are surprisingly strong, especially given the limited number of observation, and 
the fact that the series were buffeted by country specific (for instance, “transition” itself, 
which happened in different moments for different countries, the banking crises described 
above) and common shocks (the Asian, Russian and oil price shocks). 
                                                 
36Those results are from regressions after the correction of three “outliers” detected after the inspection of the 
residuals of a regression with all observations (corresponding to one Polish upward and one Polish downward 
cycles, almost right at the beginning of the sample, and to a Latvian upward cycle during the height of the 
“Asian Crisis”). The elimination of these three “outliers” almost trembles the R
2 of the regressions, halves its 
standard error and improves significantly the Durbin-Watson statistic, but without changing qualitatively the 
significance or sign of the variables. Quantitatively, the estimated value of the duration increase of the upwards 
cycles and of the decrease of the downward cycles post-liberalization falls substantially. 
37The usage of a German “world” real interest rate makes this variable positive significant with a substantially 
larger point estimate, but in the “upward” cycle regressions only, and without affecting significantly the other 
variables. 
38Edwards et al., 2003, confirms those significant “excess returns” emerging markets when compared to mature 
ones, and considered them to be a necessary reward for the higher volatility. 
  20 6.2. Institutional Reform and EU Accession 
 
 
The institutional underpinnings of the liberalization process are essential to the 
analysis performed here, as one of the aims of this work is to test the if the EU institutional 
framework imposed by the Accession process is what enabled them to derive the previous 
welfare-enhancing results from liberalization. K&S, in their work, represent the “quality of 
institutions” via a dummy series based on the monthly ICRG (International Country Risk 
Guide) “Law and Order” index, which assumes a value of one if the index is growing or at its 
maximum (the ICRG index itself has a maximum value of six, with three granted to the “law” 
component and three to the “order” one). K&S also use information on insider trading laws 
and enforcement, taken from Bhattacharya and Baouk, ibid, 2002. This work uses also the 
ICRG index, but not the data from Bhattacharya and Baouk, as the information in that paper 
doesn’t fit neither the knowledge of this author concerning the level of legal enforcement in 
the sample of countries here used, nor with the conclusions of works like Reininger et al., 
2002, ibid. Therefore, a modified version of K&S equation (2) is estimated, as given by 
 






i i i d d d d X amplitude + + + + + =
&
1 1 1 1 1  (2) 
 
where the new variable   is the dummy based on the ICRG Law and Order index. The 
results are show on Table XI below. They do not change qualitatively or quantitatively and 







Included observations:  61(up) 57 (down)  Upward Cycle  Downward Cycle 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
World Real Interest Rate  0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
World Output  -0.02* 0.01  -0.02*  0.01 
Domestic Output  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Financial Repression Dummy  2.53* 0.62  2.75*  0.96 
Short Run Liberalization Dummy  2.60* 0.64  2.72*  0.94 
Long Run Liberalization Dummy  2.65* 0.62  2.75*  0.94 
Law and Order Dummy  -0.03 0.06  -0.06  0.06 
Constant not show; * indicates significance at the 1% 
level.  R
2: 0.86  DW: 2.18  R
2: 0.91  DW: 2.65 
 
To specifically verify the hypothesis that the EU integration process was the main 
force driving the liberalization process, the same regression as on section 6.1 was run with 
dummies for the periods after i) the Europe Association Agreements were signed (EUts), ii) 
the date of official application for EU membership (EUa) and iii) the date in which they 
entered into force (EUt). The results are rather similar to the previous ones: upwards cycles 
significantly increase with liberalization and downward cycles decrease in the short run 
(albeit with somewhat stronger estimated effects, specially for the EUt dummy regression). 
All those coefficients are significant. Again, the new dummies are not significant, with one 
exception, the EUa dummy in upwards cycles: it significantly decreases them. Those are 
perhaps intuitive results, as one would expect some of the effects of the EU and Law and 
  21 Order dummies to be captured by the liberalization dummies, but the assumption concerning 




Included observations:  61(up) 57 (down)  Upward Cycle  Downward Cycle 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
World Real Interest Rate  0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
World Output  -0.02* 0.01  -0.02** 0.01 
Domestic Output  -0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Financial Repression Dummy  2.00* 0.56 2.31* 0.74 
Short Run Liberalization Dummy  2.04* 0.55 2.28* 0.73 
Long Run Liberalization Dummy  2.11* 0.56 2.37* 0.83 
Europe Association Agreements Dummy  0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.07 
Constant now show. * and ** indicate significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  R
2: 0.81  DW: 2.06  R
2: 0.89  DW: 2.51 
 
Table XI 
Included observations:  61(up) 57 (down)  Upward Cycle  Downward Cycle 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
World Real Interest Rate  0.02*** 0.01  -0.02  0.02 
World Output  -0.01 0.01  -0.02* 0.01 
Domestic Output  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Financial Repression Dummy  1.17* 0.56 2.31* 0.74 
Short Run Liberalization Dummy  1.24** 0.56 2.28*  0.73 
Long Run Liberalization Dummy  1.34** 0.56 2.33*  0.73 
EU Application Dummy  -0.23** 0.12  -0.03  0.20 
Constant not show; *, ** and *** indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  R
2: 0.82  DW: 2.26  R
2: 0.89  DW: 2.51 
 
Table XII 
Included observations:  61(up) 57 (down)  Upward Cycle  Downward Cycle 
Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
World Real Interest Rate  0.01 0.01  -0.02  0.02 
World Output  -0.01* 0.01  -0.02**  0.01 
Domestic Output  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Financial Repression Dummy  1.17* 0.47 2.08* 0.93 
Short Run Liberalization Dummy  1.75* 0.47 2.06* 0.90 
Long Run Liberalization Dummy  1.81** 0.47 2.10* 0.89 
Europe Agreement in Force Dummy  -0.07 0.07 -0.10 0.11 
Constant now show. * and ** indicate significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  R
2: 0.81  DW: 2.01  R
2: 0.89  DW: 2.48 
 
 
                                                 
39Using together the “Law and Order” and EU dummies, these results remain mostly unchanged. 
  22 7. Beyond K&S: Alternative Estimations 
 
 
  Given the potential shortcomings of the previous analysis, which are derived both 
from limitations on the original K&S framework and from the specific features of my dataset, 
a set of alternative specifications was also estimated. Namely, other measures of volatility, 
both financial, real and nominal, were used as the LHS of the regressions below, namely, the 
standard deviation of i) the stock market index, ii) the industrial production index and iii) the 
changes in the nominal exchange rate, in rolling variance time-windows of 2 to 6 months 
(following Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c)), as given by (3) below. The basic notion 
behind this is that liberalization and integration will affect, and in a more fundamental 
fashion, not just the cyclical, but also the overall real and nominal volatility of a given 
economy, albeit in a not unambiguous fashion (for instance, if financial integration leads to 
increased specialization, it could increase country-specific shocks: see Razin and Rose, 1994). 
 
ε ρ α i i i i I X volatility + + =
1  (3) 
 
Now the Xi matrix of control variables includes, beyond the world real interest rate, 
world output growth, domestic output growth, a domestic nominal exchange rate index (re-
based to May 1998, as the other indexes), the level of the S&P 500 equity index (equally re-
based to May 1998), the domestic stock market indexes, dummies for a float exchange rate 
regime, a hard peg regime, a sliding peg regime for the specific country/period per regime 
(following Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c), ibid) and, finally, the variable Ii, for 
“index”, which is either the full Liberalization Index or its three components. As the index is 
better seen as a measure of financial restriction, a positive sign will indicate that a increase in 
liberalization reduces volatility. The results for the 6-months variance window using the full 
sample, the most robust ones, are show in Table XIII below (those results are from a fixed 




As one might see, the R
2s are surprisingly smaller than the ones on the previous 
regressions, and the coefficients of the “control set” are rather small, but mostly significant (in 
a result similar to Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c), almost all exchange rate 
frameworks significantly reduce the volatility of the stock market and nominal exchange rate 
variables, but increase the one of the industrial production series). Concentrating the analysis 
on the liberalization index variables, the full index significantly decreases the volatility of 
both the stock market and the industrial production index, but the point estimate is only truly 
substantial for the industrial production series
41. When the index is disaggregated on its 
components, one may see that the variability reducing effects are driven by capital account 
liberalization component, which has the highest point estimate of all components (bar the 
financial sector liberalization component on the industrial production regression), while the 
stock market and the financial sector components significantly increases volatility. These 
results tend to remain the same using a post-1996 sample. The main changes are that, beyond 
                                                 
40The variables for world real interest rate, world output growth and the level of the S&P 500 equity index were 
replaced in the control set by the German real interest rate, the German Industrial production index and the DAX 
index. The results for those variables were almost always non significant when this was done. 
41This is very likely related to the “transition recession” adjustment. A short sample estimation that starts on 
1996, i.e., after the bulk of the industrial restructuring was done, renders this coefficient non-significant. 
  23 the one described on footnote 41, the stock market and the financial sector components 
become non-significantly on the stock market regression. 
 
Table XIII 
Included observations: 920 (Stock 
Market), 927 (Industrial Production) 















Variables  Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. 
World Real Interest Rate  0.0003 0.0002  0.02  0.02  0.003  0.00005 
World Output Index  -0.004* -0.004*  0.02  0.01  0.10*  0.1* 
Domestic Output Index  -0.0004* -0.0004*  0.01  0.01  0.004  0.005*** 
Nominal Exchange Rate Index  0.00005 0.00001  0.002  0.02  -0.001  0.00001 
Standard and Poor Index  0.01*** 0.01**  -2.11**  -2.02**  0.42  0.53 
Domestic Stock Market Index  0.04* 0.05*  2.13**  2.55*  -1.21*  -0.83* 
Float Dummy  -0.005 0.01**  1.86*  1.56**  -3.12*  -2.87* 
Hard Peg Dummy  -0.04* -0.01  2.38*  2.48**  -3.75*  -3.09* 
Sliding Peg Dummy  -0.02* -0.0002  1.76*  1.78**  -3.32*  -2.92* 
Full Liberalization Index  -0.01* _  -1.31**  -  -0.38  - 
Capital Account Liberalization  _  0.05* _  1.59** _ 1.83* 
Stock Market Liberalization  _ -0.03*  _  -0.66***  _  -0.75* 
Financial Sector Liberalization  _ -0.02*  _  -2.03*  _  -0.91* 
Constant and country terms not show; *, ** 
and *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  R
2: 0.33  R
2: 0.37  R
2: 0.48  R
2: 0.48  R
2: 0.60  R
2: 0.60 
 
Adding the EU dummies used in the previous section to the regression above shows 
that  all the three dummies reduce volatility significantly in most cases, leaving the other 
coefficients broadly unaffected. Peculiarly, when one uses the Law & Order dummy, it is non-
significant on the industrial production regressions, increases volatility significantly on the 
stock market ones and reduces it significantly on the exchange rate ones, while rendering the 
liberalization index (full and components) insignificant on the industrial production and 
exchange rate estimations. When this is used together with the EU dummies, these results 
remain, but only the EUt and EUa dummies are always significant, perhaps indicating the 
somewhat delayed effects of the Accession process on the legal framework and enforcement. 
 
From a more clear theoretical point of view, financial liberalization and integration 
should also enable a reduction of the volatility of consumption, as it would allow better 
international risk-sharing opportunities (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1998). Given that, I also 
estimated the regression above using three quarters standard deviation series of consumption -
-both private and total, i.e., including government consumption expenditures- as a GDP share 
as the dependent variable. As this data is available only on a quarterly basis and for shorter 
time samples, the number of observations is substantially reduced. The results are on Table 
XIV below. As one might see, the R
2s are again rather small and now also all the point 
estimates are rather small. More importantly, all the liberalization index variables are now 
non-significant, with the exception of the stock market liberalization component, which 
  24 significantly decreases volatility
42. The EU dummies are equally non-significant (bar the EUts 
dummy on the total consumption regressions) and these results remain the same using a post-
1996 sample.  
 
Table XIV 









Variables  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. 
World Real Interest Rate  -0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0012* -0.0011** 
World Output Index  -0.0016* -0.0016*  -0.0017**  -0.0017** 
Domestic Output Index  -0.0000 -0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000 
Nominal Exchange Rate Index  0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001*  0.0001** 
Standard and Poor Index  0.0159*** 0.0167** 0.0219***  0.0226** 
Domestic Stock Market Index  0.0274* 0.0258* 0.0357*  0.0337* 
Float Dummy  0.0164** 0.0075  0.0154 0.0065 
Hard Peg Dummy  0.0267** 0.0191  0.0248 0.0168 
Sliding Peg Dummy  0.0091** 0.0002  0.0072 -0.0018 
Full Liberalization Index  0.0008 _ -0.0006  _ 
Capital Account Liberalization  _ -0.0111 _  -0.0131 
Stock Market Liberalization  _ 0.0121** _ 0.0119 
Financial Sector Liberalization  _ -0.0082 _  -0.0074 
Constant and country terms not show; *, ** 
and *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  R
2: 0.31  R
2: 0.32  R







  The main aim of this paper was to extend the index developed by Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2003, for a specific sample of countries, namely, the previously centrally planned 
economies from Central and Eastern Europe that are candidate countries for membership in 
the European Union, and to perform a similar analysis on them. 
 
  My results do lend some support to the basic assumption of this study: in spite of all 
the limitations of the time series used (their shortness, the fact that they were buffeted by 
several country-specific and common shocks), a re-estimation of K&S’s core regressions 
strongly supports the notion that financial liberalization does generate benefits both in the 
short and in the long run, measured via the extension of the amplitude of upward cycles and 
its reduction for downward cycles of stock market indexes. Importantly, these results diverge 
from K&S, as in their work “emerging markets” experience a relative short run increase in 
the amplitude of downward cycles. 
 
  Another noteworthy feature is that only minor liberalization reversals, led by the 
financial sector component, were observed in the aggregate index. Also, those reversals do 
                                                 
42Kose et al., 2003, and Prasad et al., 2003, obtains somewhat comparable results, concerning their MFI (more 
financially integrated) sample of emerging markets. 
  25 not seem to be driven by “contagion” from shocks in other emerging markets (like the Asian 
or Russian crisis), but reflect country-specific shocks. When considering the individual 
components of the index separately, again signs of minor reversals in financial sector 
liberalization are observed, related to temporary reactions to the several banking crisis 
observed in the region.  
 
  Concerning the importance of institutions and of the EU Accession, this paper’s initial 
assumption was that the mostly positive results above would come about due to the anchoring 
of expectation provided by the perspective of entry into the EU already by mid-2004 (or 2007, 
in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) for the countries here analyzed, and by the imposition of 
a more robust macro and institutional framework by the requirements of the Accession 
process itself. Signs of this are not found in the K&S regressions, perhaps because the 
liberalization index itself captures the effects of the EU Accession process. 
 
  Finally, using a different framework than K&S’s to assess the affects of liberalization 
on financial, real and nominal volatility, most of the econometric results seem to support the 
previous ones, but they seem to indicate that the capital account liberalization is the element 
that most consistently and significantly reduces volatility. On this final section, the majority 
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-Annex I: Graphs of Individual Indexes per Country. 
 
Country codings: BU: Bulgaria; CZ: Czech Republic; ES: Estonia; HU: Hungary; LA: 
Latvia; LI: Lithuania; PL: Poland; RO: Romania; SA: Slovakia, SE: Slovenia. 
 
Index codings: FI: Full Liberalization Index; KAL: Capital Account Liberalization Index; 
FSL: Financial Sector Liberalization Index; SML: Stock Market Liberalization Index. 
 
Figures A-I and A-II, Liberalization Index, Bulgaria (left) and the Czech Republic (right). 
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Figures A-VII and A-VIII, Liberalization Index, Poland (left) and Romania (right). 
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Annex II: Descriptive Indexes by Country. 
  32 Countries Capital  Account 
Liberalization 




Bulgaria  -2/95: EU Association 
Agreement 
-5/90, peg to a basket of 
imports’ prices, two “market 
rates”; 2/91, float and unified 
exchange system; 7/97: CBA 
(preparations started with IMF-
SbP in April); 
-Original CBA law from 6/97  
–IMF entry: 25/9/90. Article 
VIII: 24/9/98; 
-Borrowing abroad allowed 
with registration at the BNB: no 
apparent limits, or maturity or 
reserve requirements; 
-Decree n. 56 of 89: FDI 
allowed with registration. 
Capital outflows allowed with 
prior registration with the BNB; 
-2/91: deposits on foreign 
accounts allowed (residents and 
non-residents: non-residents 
require BNB approval for 
transaction over 20.000 Leva): 
during the banking crisis of May 
1996 –the runs were 
concentrated on foreign 
currency deposits, foreign 
deposits of the closed 
institutions were transferred to 
the Postbank, to be paid in four 
installments over a 2 years 
period (immediate payment 
would be possible only in Leva: 
as the choice was not binding, 
depositors could switch between 
them at any point in time). 
Banks also seem to have used a 
‘informal rescheduling’ on the 
payment of foreign currency 
deposits; Another run started in 
September 1996; Limits on 
banks’ non-Euro currency open 
positions; 
-credit to residents and non-
residents allowed. 
-no controls on interest rates 
(freed in 1991); 
-5/92: First Stock Exchange 
begins trading (twenty regional 
ones, consolidated in 1996); 
-6/95: Law on Securities, 
Exchange and Securities 
Companies; 
  10/97: The Bulgarian Stock 
Exchange-Sofia (resulting from 
the consolidation of the previous 
stock exchanges) was officially 
licensed by the National 
Securities and Stock Exchange 
Commission in 10/97. There have 
never been any restrictions 
regarding the acquisition of 
shares, securities and bonds by 
foreign investors (over 60%of the 
stock market).   At no time has 
there been any reversal of this. 
Also, since trading operations 
started there haven't been any 
restrictions regarding the 
repatriation of capital, dividends 
and interest by foreign investors. 
No periods of reversal. Prior 
registration with the BNB needed 
(10/97: Registration at the MoF 
abolished); 





-2/95: (new) Europe Agreement 
(Previous Trade Agreement 
since 3/92); 
-12/95: OECD membership; 
-A peg to (reduced from 5 
currencies to a DEM/USD in 
5/93) basket since 06/81 until 
May 27 1997. Since then a 
managed float regime. 
-Original CB law from 12/92.  
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the 
Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, and, since 1/1/1993, 
as separate states). Article VIII: 
1/10/95; 
-1/99: most controls on capital 
transactions eliminated; 
-No apparent controls on 
borrowing abroad. 
-Capital outflows allowed 
-Unified exchange rate 
-FDI allowed 
-repatriations/liquidation free. 
12/90: new enterprise residents 
foreign account need exemption 
form surrender requirements; 
non-residents foreign accounts 
of two types (in Koruna, whose 
transfers abroad require 
permission, and on convertible 
currency, free); 
-credit controls: 8/95: limits on 
short term (up to 1 year) banks 
open positions towards non-
residents (removed 11/97); 
-1/99: elimination of control on 
financial credit operations 
backed by securities;  
-4/00: limits on funds abroad by 
credit unions, pension funds and 
insurance companies lifted; 
-1/01: deposits on foreign 
accounts (resident and non-
resident) no longer need pre-
approval (existed only for ones 
held abroad); Limits on banks’ 
currency open positions; 
-Interest rates freed in 4/92. 
4/93: Stock Exchange begins 
trading; 
-Acquisition of the shares and 
bonds by foreign investors is 
allowed since the opening of the 
current stock market in the Czech 
Republic. The only limitation 
concerns purchase of bank shares 
– CNB consent needed. No 
apparent limits on repatriations 
(after payment of income taxes); 
-4/97: permits for foreign 
securities no longer needed; 
-1/99: elimination of controls on 
foreign securities; 4/99 pension 
funds and insurance companies 
may place funds abroad; 
-01/01: bonds and money market 
instruments –MMIs- had their 
remaining controls for non-




-Stock Index Available. 
Estonia  -Independence: 20/8/91 
-2/98: Europe Agreement; 
-Currency board system since 
-12/93: residents need 
permission to open foreign 
account in foreign banks; 
-5/95: Foundation of Tallinn 
Stock Exchange; Acquisition of 
shares, securities and bonds by 
  33 June 20 1992. Original CB law 
from 18 of May 1993. 
-IMF entry: May 25 1992. 
Article VIII: 15/8/94; 
-1993: FDI subject to MoF 
approval (and Capt. Acct. 
Movements to EP approval); 
-Borrowing abroad allowed; 
-Unified exchange rate; 
-capital outflow allowed; 
deposits on foreign accounts in 
domestic banks allowed since 
1995 (7/97: resident and non-
resident: reserve requirements 
on net liabilities to foreign 
credit institutions. This was 
changed to the liabilities (i.e. 
netting with foreign assets is not 
permitted anymore) to foreign 
credit institutions in 3/03. This 
change is fully in line with the 
reserve requirement principles 
in the Eurosystem; 
-no controls on interest rates; 
foreign investors and repatriation 
of capital, dividends and interest 
by foreign investors has been 
allowed since the beginning; 









-Stock Index Available 
Hungary  -3/92 (trade) and 2/94(full): EU 
Association Agreement 
-5/96: OECD Membership 
-From 1990, an 11-currency 
basket peg; 12/91 adjustable 
peg to a DEM/USD basket. A 
float within an ERM- type band  
(+/-15%) was introduced in 
05/01. 
-Original CB law from 1991 
(with new ESCB-compatible 
law introduced in 2001).  
-IMF entry: 05/06/1982. Article 
VIII: 1/1/96; 
-Unified exchange rate; 
-1/91: registration of FDI via 
JV eliminated (over 10% in 
banks still requires 
authorization); 
-(1/91) Borrowing abroad 
allowed but needs reporting, 
needs MNB permission for 
short-term capital; 
-1/96: Investment abroad 
allowed if over 10% of the 
capital on the company being 
invested, with some pre-
requisites. No controls on 
liquidation of FDI; 
-Full Liberalization: 05-06/01 
(approval grounds for resident 
and no-resident accounts 
extended, automatic MNB 
transfer authorization from 
sales of securities by non –
residents; outward FDI 
liberalized 
-deposits on foreign accounts 
allowed with the need of pre-
approval in certain cases, and 
restricted to juridical residents; 
no overdrafts on foreign 
currency domestic accounts; 
1993: proceeds from previously 
non liberalized activities 
allowed to be deposited in non-
residents accounts as non re-
convertible Forint funds, same 
with credit to non-residents; 
1/98: residents and non-
residents grounds for approval 
of foreign currency accounts 
extended; 
-credit controls; 11/97: long 
term lending to non-residents 
allowed;  1/99: differential 
reserve requirements for non-
residents in short term credits 
(7/01/:removed); 1/01: credit of 
more than 1 year to OECD non-
residents allowed; 6/01: Short 
tem credit freed; 
-no controls on interest rates 
(enterprises in 1987, households 
in 91/92); 
-6/90: Stock Exchange 
established; 
-7/96: non-residents from OECD 
allowed to buy debt securities of 
over 1 year maturity; 
-1/97: trading of OECD shares   
and bonds with over 1-year 
maturity allowed; 1/98: 
sales/acquisition of shares and 
securities from OECD companies 
allowed, other need authorization, 
while domestic acquisition of 
shares or MMIs by non-residents 
needs MNB permission (if 
maturity less than 1 year); 7/00: 
sale/issue of collective securities 
by residents and non-residents 
allowed. 
*1988: Introduction of three 
month T-Bills (non-residents   
only allowed to participate in the 
T-Bill market from 6/01); 1996, 2 
& 3-year T-Bonds, 2001 15-year 
T-Bonds (by a Government Debt 
Management Agency); limited 
private bond market, due to 
preference for external debt 
(linked to the earlier exchange 
rate regime) and the privatization 
strategy (direct sales), lack of 






-Stock Index Available 
Latvia  -Independence: 21/8/91 
-2/98: Europe Agreement; 
-Latvian ruble, temporary 
currency, introduced in 5/92 
and co-existed with the Ruble 
from 5-7/92. The national 
currency - the lats - was 
introduced in 3/93. 
-Dirty float from 7/92 to 3/93. 
-5/92: Two-tier banking system; 
-deposits on foreign accounts 
allowed (resident and non-
resident); 
-7/92: no controls on interest 
rates; 
-credit controls: specific 
aggregate exposure limits to 
non-OECD countries 
-12/93: Stock Exchange 
established. Acquisition and 
repatriations by foreign investors 
allowed since the beginning; 
-8/02: Finnish HEX acquires Riga 




  34 Basket peg to the IMF SDR 
since 2/94. 
-Original CB law from 
19/5/1992; 
-IMF entry: May 19 1992. 
Article VIII: 10/6/94; 
-Borrowing abroad allowed; 
-Unified exchange rate; 
-capital outflow allowed; 
(maximum of 25% of capital in 
any individual country, 
maximum of 200% of capital in 
any group of countries, bar 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(Removed in 4/03); 
-1/03: Suspension of licensing 
requirement for branches of the 
banks registered in the EU (the 
entry into force still to be 











-Stock Index Available. 
Lithuania  -Independence: 11/3/90 
(declared), 6/9/91 (accepted by 
URSS); 
-2/98: Europe Agreement; 
-Talonas, floating coupon 
currency, introduced in 5/92, 
and co-existed with the Ruble 
from 5-10/92. Litas introduced 
in 6/93. CBA in 10/93. 
-Current CB law from 1994;  
-IMF entry: April 29 1992. 
Article VIII: 3/5/1994 
-Unified exchange rate; 
-FDI law: 12/90, amended 2/92 
and 6/92: repatriation permitted 
(tax advantages for longer 
stays); 
-borrowing abroad allowed; 
-9/92: Two-tier banking system; 
-deposits on foreign accounts 
allowed (resident and non-
resident: for those, reserve 
requirements since 1/98; Bank 
run 12/95-3/96; Deposit 
insurance extended to foreign 
deposits in 2/96, deeper reforms 
of the banking sector stability 
problems in 12/96; 
-no credit controls (for either 
residents or non-residents) 
-no controls on interest rates; 
-9/93: Stock Exchange trading 
begins: Acquisition and 
repatriations by foreign investors 
allowed since the stock exchange 
opened in September 1993; BoLi 
authorization still necessary for 
acquisition/management of 
banking shares: the EU has asked 
for replacement of this with mere 
notification (an early requirement 
limited bank’s foreign share 
ownership to 49% of capital: 
BoLi may have early in the 
process  informally discouraged 
the licensing of foreign banks, in 
spite of the lax and non-
discriminatory licensing 
requirements). 
-Stock Index Available. 
Poland  -2/94: Europe Agreement 
-11/96: OECD membership; 
-Peg with the USD from 1990. 
5/91 crawling regime 
introduced. 4/00 float. 
-Original CB Law from 31 
January 1989; 
-IMF entry: 06/12/1986. Article 
VIII: 1/6/1995. 
-Unified exchange rate; 
-7/91: New FDI law: local 
registration, and generalized 
permit, no lower limit for 
investment, elimination of tax 
credits (replacing 23/11/88 one) 
(annual limits of 10% of capital 
invested on profit transfers: 
after that, permission required); 
2/96: NBP permit for FDI 
outward flows to OECD (limit 
1 million ECU), no controls on 
profits or liquidations of inward 
FDI outflows; 
-6/95: Full current account 
convertibility. 
1996: Foreign loans authorized 
to specific banks, but subject to 
approval; Loans to non-
residents allowed, subject to 
approval; 
-11/90: “ROD” foreign account 
for legal persons; deposits on 
foreign accounts allowed with 
permit; (resident and non-
resident: for those, different 
reserve requirements and limits 
on time and dimension for 
convertibility of domestic 
currency accounts); 
-Credit controls: NBP 
notification, permission needed 
for short term credit to non-
residents (lifted on 1/98), while 
short term financial credit from 
residents to non-residents above 
a limit prohibited: 1/99; Limits 
on banks’ currency open 
positions; 
-1988: two-tier banking system 
introduced. 
-no controls on interest rates 
(freed in 1/90); 
 
-4/89: First stock issue after 50 
years; 4/91: Stock Exchange 
reopened; Acquisition and 
repatriations by foreign investors 
allowed since the beginning; 
-2/97: limit for investment in 
foreign securities issued 
domestically increased. Residents 
allowed to purchase OECD 
securities; 
-1/1/98: buying of foreign 
securities by banks allowed;  
-2001: still some controls on the 
acquisition by foreign investors of 
short-term securities (MMIs: NBP 
approval). Nationals may 
invest/sell bonds, shares and 
securities in OECD countries. 
-1/91: T-Bill (up to 52-weeks: 
NBP) and T-bonds (up to 10-y: 
NDS). Heavily regulated market 
(result: 98% of volume in 
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-Stock Index Available 
Romania  -2/95: Europe Agreement 
(Trade Agreement: 5/93); 
-1-9/90: unique fixed exchange 
rate; the US dollar used as a 
reference currency for the ROL 
exchange rate till 2003; 9/90-
11/91: dual exchange rates; 
11/91-5/92: unique managed 
floating; full surrender of 
foreign exchange proceeds; 
5/92-4/94: the same basic 
features, but full retention of 
foreign exchange proceeds; 
4/94- 2/97: NBR's 
administrative interventions on 
the forex market;2/97-2/98: de 
facto liberalisation of both 
exchange rate and forex market 
with managed floating regime 
being maintained; 2/98 - to 
date: current account 
convertibility of the ROL, 
managed floating rate regime; 
3/03: Euro became the 
reference currency for the ROL 
exchange rate. 
-Original CB law from 3/4/ 
1991, autonomy strengthened 
in 1998;  
-Unified exchange rate; 
-IMF entry: 15/12/1972. Article 
VIII: 25/3/1998; 
-3/90: FDI beyond JV allowed, 
repatriation in full if generated 
by currency proceeds, 
otherwise 8% of capital per 
year (15% since 11/90); 7/93: 
full repatriation and liquidation 
allowed; 8/96: Surrender 
requirements re-introduced; 
-Borrowing abroad allowed 
with NBR authorization; 
personal loans require NBR 
authorization. 12/01: Medium 
and long term commercial 
credit from non-residents to 
residents liberalized; 
-12/90: Two-tier banking 
system 
-deposits on foreign accounts 
allowed: 1/90: residents and 
non-residents accounts 
liberalized (less restrictions on 
use and payment of interest 
allowed). The current level of 
reserves requirements is still 
differentiated (18% for ROL-
denominated deposits, 25% for 
forex-denominated). Still the 
convertibility of domestic 
currency accounts, for capital 
account operations –type B- is 
limited and requires NBR 
approval; 
-Credit controls: 5/98: NBR 
permission for short term credit; 
7/99: credit operation of over a 
year to non-residents 
liberalized; Limits on banks’ 
currency open positions; 
-FDI in (for banks above 5% of 
capital) and out-bound requires 
NBR authorization. 
-no controls on interest rates 
since 8/91, and no credit 
ceilings since 9/91 (interbank 
market 4/91, while the official 
interbank market was only 
established in 4/95; preferential 
credits to the agricultural sector 
eliminated in 1997); 
 
-11/95: Stock Exchange begins to 
operate; the acquisition of shares 
by non-residents was from the 
beginning fully allowed (but 
cumbersome approval procedure 
for profit repatriation before 6/97, 
and a minimum investment of 
10.000 USD). Direct trading of 
short term (less than 1 year 
maturity) government bonds 
however, was and is restricted. 
Also, no repatriation obstacles 


































-Stock Index Available 
Slovakia  -Czechoslovakia break-up: 
1/1/93 
-2/95: (new) Europe Agreement 
-8/00: OECD Membership; 
-Peg regime with intervention 
bands to a basket since 1/1/93. 
Float since October 1 1998. 
-Original CB law of 18 
November 1992.  
-Unified exchange rate; 
-4/98: deposits on foreign 
accounts allowed (residents 
require permission), non-
resident accounts convertible 
into foreign currency are only 
allowed if related to current 
transactions); 
-Credit controls: 12/96: foreign 
long-term (over 3 years) 
borrowing by residents allowed, 
-4/93: Stock exchange begins 
trading; 
-7/97: foreign exchange permits 
eliminated for the issue of foreign 
securities; 
-4/98: OECD-nationals can 
acquire securities; 1/00: domestic 
sales and purchases of bonds, 
shares, securities & MMIs by 
non-residents mostly liberalized 
  36 IMF entry: January 1 1993. 
Article VIII: 1/10/1995. 
-BoSa permit necessary for FDI 
outward flows, no controls on 
profits or liquidations of inward 
FDI outflows (controls on FDI 
and  domestic investment in 
domestic banks: those are 
allowed only since 2/98). 
-Credits from abroad allowed, 
with BoSa approval; 
financial long-term credit to 
non-residents (over 5 years) 
allowed; 1/00, permit required 
only for short-term –i.e., under a 
year, non-OECD credit 
residents-non-residents and 
vice-versa; 1/01, this limit 
abolished; 1/02: limits of banks’ 
investments abroad; 
-no controls on interest rates 
(liberalized on 4/92); 
for OECD residents  (short-term -
less than 1 year- requires 
permission); 1/01: sales abroad by 







-Stock Index Available. 
Slovenia  -6/96: EU Association 
Agreement (to entry in effect in 
2/99); 
-Independence: 25/6/91 
-Managed Float since 
8/10/1991. 
-Original CB law of 25/6/1991.  
-Unified exchange rate; 
-IMF entry: 14/12/1992. Article 
VIII: 1/9/1995. 
-BoSe FDI outward flows 
allowed with notification, 7/99  
(with authorization for banks: 
purchase of securities by them 
allowed since 12/98), no 
controls on profits or 
liquidations of inward FDI 
outflows (controls on FDI share 
in financial and other types of 
companies). 
-3/99: Foreign bank branches 
allowed (foreign participation 
in capital of banks dependent 
on BoSe approval: “Foreign 
Exchange Act”); 
-Borrowing abroad allowed 
(short term restricted in 2/95: 
BoSe required a 40% deposit 
for loans of less than 5 years in 
an unremunerated Tolar 
account); 
-FDI allowed since old 
Yugoslav federation times; 
 
-deposits on foreign accounts 
allowed with BoSe approval 
(residents: reserve requirements 
and juridical persons not 
allowed to have them; 9/99; 
non-residents Tolar withdraws 
unlimited after 1/01, accounts 
convertible into foreign 
currency are only allowed if 
relate to current transactions); 
-credit controls: 4/92: cover –
held abroad- of domestically 
held foreign deposits set at 5%-
90% (depending on maturity); 
loans to non-residents only with 
profits from abroad; 1/97: 
financial credit to non-residents 
allowed; 2/97: limits on 
withdraws from non-residents 
(eliminated on 9/99); 5/97: 
obligatory interest free deposit 
of foreign loans removed; 2/99: 
permission for banks to raise 
external short-term credit;  1/00, 
permit required for short-term, 
non-OECD credit residents-non-
residents and vice-versa; 1/01, 
abolished) 
-2/95: Interbank cartel on 
deposit rates established; 
-3/99: Interbank cartel on 
deposit rates formally abolished; 
-12/89: Stock Exchange 
established; Purchase of shares by 
non-residents allowed under the 
FDI provisions, of bonds under 
credit with foreign countries 
provisions  (no separate ones), 
issues or sale by non-residents not 
allowed (limits on foreign 
ownership in financial and other 
types of companies; permission 
required to acquire more than 
25% of shares in large companies 
–over 800 mil. SIT); 
-2/97: BoSe introduced restrictive 
measures by requiring all new 
non-resident portfolio     
investments in Slovenian 
securities to be held in custody 
accounts. By 6/97, the CB 
enabled cheaper custody services 
for foreign portfolio investors 
who would commit not to sell 
their investments back to local 
investor for a period of 7 years 
(while free to trade off-shore).  
The entry in effect of the 
Association Agreement with the 
EU in 2/99 requires Slovenia to 
gradually remove of all foreign 
investment restrictions.  The   CB 
liberalized gradually: on 9/99 it 
amended investment regulations, 
lowering the period during which 
a foreign investor would not be 
able sell their portfolio     
investment back to the local 
market to 1 year (6 months, 1/01), 
unless they opt for purchases into 
non- restricted “hedged” custody 
accounts described below 
(unrestricted foreign portfolio 
investments in Slovenian     
securities is allowed through 
“hedged” custody accounts: on 
7/99, the charges on these 
accounts were  lowered from 
2.5%  to 0.7% per quarter). Once 
purchased into restricted custody 
accounts, securities cannot be 
  37   38 
unblocked by transferring them to 
the “hedged” custody account. No 
restrictions apply  to a foreign 
shareholder positions of more   
than 10% of a company's equity.    
9/99: Slovene entities able to 
make portfolio investments 
abroad and it become easier to 
make cross-border credit 
transactions (foreign borrowing). 
Foreign investors   could now buy 
up to 10% of local bank shares 
without needing prior CB 
approval. 7/01: remaining 
restrictions on foreign 
investments lifted; 1/02: full 
liberalization on securities and 
MMIs acquisition by non-
residents; 
-Stock Index Available. 
*Acquisition of land by foreigners suffers some limitations in all countries. Financial sector derogations on 
Accession treaties for most countries on agricultural credit unions and similar regional/local institutions. 